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Understanding the economic lifecycle – how it varies and why – is important in its own right, but
is also critical to understanding how changes in population age structure influence many features of
the macroeconomy.  Economic behavior over the life cycle can be summarized by the average levels
of consumption and labor earnings at each age, as shaped by biology, culture, institutions and
individual choice. Here we present estimates of these in detail for the US and Taiwan, showing the
roles played by public and familial transfer systems as well as asset accumulation, and present more
basic profiles for selected additional countries drawing on studies from a larger project. Average
economic dependency occurs when consumption exceeds labor earnings, typically in childhood and
old age. A changing population age distribution alters the relative numbers of weighted consumers
and producers, as summarized by the support ratio. The “demographic dividend” occurs during a
sustained period of improving support ratios during the demographic transition, as can be shown
using these profiles. The estimated cross-sectional age profiles of labor income have a broadly
similar hump shape. However, there are striking contrasts in the timing of earnings over the life
cycle. The consumption profiles reveal even more striking contrasts, with a flat age profile of total
adult consumption in Taiwan and a steeply rising one in the U.S. We believe these differences reflect
the extended family versus the state as the primary locus of transfers to the elderly. Profiles for
private consumption are also quite variable, with Indonesia peaking early around age 25, Taiwan
being essentially flat, and the US peaking late at around 55. Private expenditures on education show
wide variations, with unusually high expenditures in some Asian countries. Because of possible
public-private substitutions, it is questionable to assign causality to either for differences in total
consumption, but it is hard to avoid noticing that without public spending on Medicare and
institutional Medicaid in the U.S., total consumption would decline after 55, whereas with them, it
rises strongly. There is only a short period of life during which production exceeds consumption
barely more than 30 years in the US, Taiwan, and Thailand. The brevity of this phase contrasts
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The shape of the demographic life cycle is of fundamental interest, which demographers 
recognize through extensive efforts to estimate, describe and interpret the age-shapes of 
fertility, mortality, marriage, divorce, and migration. These age-shapes are influenced by 
biology, culture, economic constraints and individual choice. Similarly, the shape of the 
economic life cycle is of fundamental interest in its own right, and this shape is 
influenced by the same set of factors. Here we will be primarily concerned with the 
estimation and description of the basic economic life cycle, and some illustrative 
comparisons of how it differs across countries and over time within countries in recent 
years.  
Economic behavior over the life cycle can be summarized by the amount 
consumed at each age and by the amount produced through labor at each age. One sort of 
economic dependency occurs when consumption exceeds labor earnings, a condition that 
marks off periods in childhood and old age. From this point of view, an older person is 
economically dependent even if she has accumulated claims on output that more than 
offset her consumption, claims that could take the form of entitlements to transfers or 
ownership of assets. Often the economic lifecycle is treated in a highly stylized fashion. 
Dependency ratios and other similar age structure variables, for example, capture only the 
broadest features of the economic lifecycle, and quadratic functions smooth through 
important details of the age patterns. Our goal here is to measure it in comprehensive 
detail. However, we have not attempted to take time use into account, so such important 
issues as the time spent by parents caring for their children, or time spent caring for 
elderly relatives, are not covered here.  
Individual consumption or production by age are seldom calculated, because 
attention naturally turns toward more disaggregated measures such as wages, labor force 
participation rates, hours worked, or household expenditures. However, although per 
capita consumption and production may seem like crude measures, they summarize and 
incorporate the influences of many factors that may have contradictory or complementary 
effects on the economic life cycle.  
Demographic age profiles for fertility and mortality are of interest because they 
describe a basic aspect of human behavior. But they are also important because they can 
be applied to a population age distribution to calculate the number of births and deaths 
occurring in a period. Such a calculation requires the assumption, seldom made explicit, 
that variations in the population age distribution and in the age profiles of fertility and 
mortality, are independent. The Easterlin Hypothesis asserts the contrary: that an 
unusually large age group will experience unusually low fertility. Similarly, an unusually 
large share of young children in the population might, in some contexts, be expected to 
cause mortality of young children to be higher. The assumption of independence makes it 
possible to generate numbers, but various feedback processes render the calculations 
suspect.  
Concerns of the same sort arise when age schedules of consumption and 
production are applied to population age distributions to generate levels of aggregate 
consumption and labor earnings, which we will call expected consumption and expected 
labor earnings. When the population age distribution changes, it alters their relative size, 
as summarized by the ratio of expected earnings to expected consumption, called the 
  2support ratio.
1 There has been recent interest in the demographic dividend, which occurs 
during a sustained period of improving support ratios during the demographic transition, 
and which is estimated using age profiles of per capita consumption and labor earnings of 
the sort described above. However, as with fertility and mortality, such calculations are 
undermined when there is feedback from the population age distribution to the age 
profiles of consumption and labor earning. For example, there is ample reason to expect 
an unusually large cohort to experience reduced earnings (Easterlin, 1978, and a large 
subsequent literature).
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  Just as broad changes in aggregate economic dependency may be illuminated by 
age profiles of consumption and labor earnings in general, more specific consequences of 
changing population age distributions can be illuminated using per capita age profiles for 
more specific kinds of consumption, production, or other economic behaviors, but always 
in reference to population level age group averages rather than conditional on 
participation. Examples include the demand for housing (Mankiw and Weil, 1989; 
McFadden, 1994), stock market fluctuations (Poterba, 2004), saving rates (Modigliani, 
1988; Mason, 1987, 1988; Cutler et al. 2001), interest rates, and impending fiscal 
problems (Lee and Edwards, 2001, 2002). As always, such disaggregation carries its own 
hazards, since there may be substitution across subcategories such as publicly provided 
health care or education, and private expenditures on these, and the overall patterns of 
change may be obscured. 
  This paper will consider methodological issues in estimating the economic life 
cycle. It will then present cross-sectional estimates of consumption and labor earning for 
a number of countries, including some disaggregation into public and private, and a 
separate examination of expenditure on education. Next, we will consider how to 
interpret and explain the differences that are observed. Finally we will consider changes 
over time in the age profiles for Taiwan and the US since around 1980.  
  The estimates presented here draw upon a number of studies that are being carried 
out as part of a larger study of the economic lifecycle and the reallocations systems - 
primarily through saving and public and familial transfers – that respond to the economic 
lifecycle.  A system of accounts, called National Transfer Accounts, is being developed 
that is consistent with National Income and Product Accounts but provides much-needed 
age data.  The methodology for constructing estimates is discussed briefly in this paper, 
but more detailed information will be available on the project website – 
www.ntaccounts.org.  The researchers and a principle source for the estimates presented 
here are provided in the references section.   
                                                 
1 For example, Cutler et al (1991) estimate support ratios for the US from 1950 to 2050. The inverse of the 
support ratio is the Chayanov ratio. Chayanov (1966) used standardized age profiles of production and 
consumption to form ratios of expected consumers to expected producers at the household level. Such 
ratios are now known as “Chayanov ratios”. See e.g Lee and Kramer, 2002. 
2 The effect of a small change in population age structure on the macro-economy can be decomposed into 
two additive components: the effect of the change in population age structure weighted by the initial age 
profiles of production and consumption (or other items of interest), plus the induced changes in the shapes 
of these age profiles weighted by the initial population age distribution (Lee, 1997). The first effect is 
compositional or mechanical, and the second is behavioral. 
  3Conceptual Background 
Individuals versus Households 
Age profiles of consumption and production are viewed from an individual, rather than a 
household, perspective in this paper.  In economies where formal sector employment 
dominates, measuring production (or earnings) for individuals is a relatively straight-
forward task.  In traditional settings, where employment is informal and production is 
often organized within a family enterprise, estimating production by age for individuals is 
difficult.  In any setting, allocating consumption to individuals is a challenging task, 
because most expenditure data are collected for households rather than individuals.  
Moreover, some goods are jointly consumed or involve increasing returns to scale so that 
allocating consumption to individuals inevitably involves arbitrary rules. 
From the household perspective, production and consumption are attributes of 
households, varying with age of the household head.  Constructing production and 
consumption profiles is more straight-forward, but there are tradeoffs involved. The first 
is that the effects of co-resident children and elderly on household consumption and 
production profiles must be explicitly modeled or – as is often the case – neglected 
altogether.  Indeed, a large share of all societal income redistribution occurs within 
households, and would therefore be invisible to accounting on a household basis. The 
second is the difficulty of translating changes in population age structure into changes in 
the age structure of household heads and household membership. 
Here we opt for the individual perspective, but irrespective of the methodology 
employed, the age patterns of consumption and production are central to understanding 
the role of population in the macroeconomy. 
Forces shaping age profiles of consumption  
A large body of theory and empirical research in economics addresses the age-time 
trajectory of consumption chosen by individuals. In the absence of intergenerational 
transfers, the expected present value of consumption must be no greater than that of labor 
earnings over the life cycle. With perfect foresight about future labor earnings, taxes, 
survival, discount rates, and other relevant information, with perfect credit markets, and 
with typical assumptions about how consumption affects utility, standard lifecycle theory 
concludes that consumption will increase exponentially with age along the optimal path 
at a rate equal to the discount rate less the rate of time preference.  Because this optimal 
path typically differs from the age trajectory of labor earnings, individuals borrow and 
lend at the market rate of interest to achieve the desired consumption path.  
  The real world circumstances of individuals violate each of these assumptions, 
and a large literature explores the consequences. The ability of individuals to borrow is 
often limited by their current net worth, credit cards aside. Future wages are unknown 
due to uncertainty about the macroeconomy, career success, and health, for example. 
Intergenerational transfers are pervasive. An individual’s consumption is funded by his 
parents until the age of economic independence, which may not come until after age 20. 
Consequently adults must allocate a substantial portion of their income to consumption 
by their children. In most contexts, elderly people live and consume in the household of 
an adult child. Thus an individual’s consumption may be governed by at least three 
  4different budget constraints over the life cycle, depending first on the resources of 
parents, then on personal resources, and finally on resources of children. Marriage, 
divorce and widowhood complicate the situation further. Bequests, which are highly 
uncertain in timing and amount, also alter the available resources. Some scholars have 
questioned the value of the lifecycle model altogether and proposed alternatives (Carroll, 
1992; Carroll and Summers, 1991; Deaton, 1991).
3    
There are many problems in estimating individual consumption. Fertility and the 
age pattern of consumption may be jointly determined, in the sense that parents may 
choose to have fewer children precisely because they want to invest more resources in 
each one of them, as in the quantity-quality theory of fertility (Becker and Lewis, 1973). 
Only a fraction of the consumption in a household is assignable to individuals, even 
conceptually. Much is joint consumption of public goods, as when a family watches TV. 
Some consumption comes in the form of in-kind transfers from the government, for 
health care, education, food, housing, or energy assistance, and these transfers are chosen 
through the political process and subject to a government budget constraint.  
  Very little research has sought to estimate consumption profiles for a society from 
cradle to grave, including both public and private transfers, as we seek to do in this paper. 
Forces Shaping the Age Profiles of Labor Earnings 
Standard economic theory views work as a tradeoff between the utility of leisure and the 
utility of the consumption that increased work allows.  An individual at each age chooses 
to work that number of hours which equates the marginal utility gained through these 
wages to the marginal utility lost from reduced leisure time.  Experience, health and 
vitality, and other factors that vary over the life cycle affect the productivity of labor and, 
therefore, its wage value.  But they also influence the utility of leisure. Variations with 
age in the competing demands on time at home, for example due to child rearing, also 
affect the opportunity cost of work. At some ages, the optimal choice may be not to work 
at all. In theory, with perfect credit markets, these decisions made at different ages are all 
closely linked over the life cycle.  You can choose not to work and yet to consume at age 
27, for example, by borrowing based on earnings you anticipate at age 52 with due 
account taken of discount rates and survival probabilities. In addition to entering the labor 
force or staying at home, individuals may spend time investing in their human capital 
through education or training, thereby raising their future earnings. Once working, they 
may devote some time to maintaining or upgrading skills, or they may let them decline. 
Work experience itself tends to raise productivity and wages. 
  As with consumption, the real world is more complex. Credit markets are 
imperfect. Workers do not have complete flexibility in choosing their hours. Institutions 
may constrain wages to rise with age through seniority systems, regardless of 
productivity. The productivity of labor, and therefore wages, will depend on 
macroeconomic conditions that are outside the control and foresight of an individual. 
Public pension programs may be unexpectedly instituted or terminated, altering the life 
cycle budget constraint and perhaps introducing strong incentives to retire from the labor 
force or return to work. Changes in tax policies may alter the tradeoff between work and 
                                                 
3 Also see Attanasio, O.P., J. Banks, C. Meghir, and G. Weber. 1999. "Humps and Bumps in Lifetime 
Consumption." Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 17(1):22-35., which provides support for the 
lifecycle model. 
  5leisure. Unemployment may thwart individual plans, and age discrimination may prevent 
older people from finding work.  
  Aside from these contextual factors, it appears that individual productivity varies 
by age. Skirbekk (2003) reviews a dozen studies, concluding that they point to an inverse 
U-shaped individual productivity profile, with significant decreases taking place from 
around 50 years of age. There are a number of reasons for declining productivity at older 
ages. A large body of literature supports the view that mental abilities decline during 
adulthood (Maitland et al. 2000, Verhaegen and Salthouse, 1997). Poor physical and 
mental health is also strongly related to early retirement (Quinn et. al. 1990; Bound, 
1991, Dwyer and Mitchell, 1999). Rapid technological progress has an uneven influence 
on skills and competencies by age (Autor et. al. 2003). Rapid changes in educational 
systems might also give middle-aged and younger workers a competitive advantage over 
their older counterparts.  
All these factors can vary over time and between countries, leading to differences 
and changes in the way earnings vary with age. Perhaps most important, however, are the 
decisions made by three demographic groups. First, many teenagers and young adults are 
extending their time in school and delaying their entry into the labor force as returns to 
education rise. Second, many women are increasing the time spent in the labor force as 
rates of childbearing have declined and labor market opportunities have improved. Third, 
older men are withdrawing from the labor force at a younger age as incomes have risen 
and pensions have become available.   
Methods for Constructing Consumption Profiles 
Consumption consists of private and public components. Age patterns of private 
consumption have been much more extensively analyzed, but public consumption – the 
consumption of in-kind transfers from the public sector – are important to developing a 
full picture of the lifecycle of consumption.   
Private Consumption 
Consumer expenditure surveys provide information on household level consumption 
expenditures. Many studies have addressed the problem of allocating these consumption 
expenditures between adults and children, typically as part of an effort to estimate the 
costs of children. Much less is known about the allocation of household consumption 
between prime age adults and the elderly. This issue is not important in societies where 
the elderly live independently because their consumption can be directly observed. In 
societies where multigenerational living arrangements are common, the issue is an 
important one about which relatively little is known.  
The general approach taken in the literature is based on some measure of the 
consumption utility of the adults in a household. With such a measure, we can ask by 
how much the total consumption of a household with one additional child would have to 
be increased in order to restore the adults’ consumption utility to its original level. The 
size of the increase measures the cost of that incremental child.  
  The Engel method uses the share of the household budget spent on food as the 
measure of adult welfare. It has been used extensively (Espenshade, 1984), but it is also 
widely criticized on conceptual grounds. The difficulty with the method is that children 
may be more intensive consumers of food than are adults. If so, families with more 
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lower, but also because the household’s preferences are tilted toward food. Thus, children 
would appear to reduce the parent’s welfare more, and therefore to cost more, than is 
actually the case. The consensus among researchers is that Engel’s method yields an 
upward biased estimate of the cost of children. On a priori grounds we can only say that 
Engel’s method will generally yield a biased result (Deaton 1997).  
  In the Rothbarth method, the welfare metric is the level of spending on goods that 
are consumed mainly by adults, usually taken to be tobacco, alcohol, and adult clothing. 
The Rothbarth method does not suffer from the same problem as Engel’s method because 
these adult goods are not consumed by children. The Rothbarth method, however, must 
assume that the presence of children in the household has no direct effect on the utility 
that adults derive from consuming their adult goods. Children must affect adult 
consumption of these goods only because they reduce the amount parents can spend on 
themselves. If the presence of children induces parents to smoke and drink more because 
of stress, for example, the Rothbarth method yields an under-estimate of the cost of 
children, and vice versa. Views vary as to whether or not this assumption is plausible. 
Several practical difficulties with the Rothbarth method limit its application. First, 
in some instances the only adult goods available are tobacco and alcohol. Expenditure on 
these is insensitive to income, owing to their addictive characteristics. Furthermore, in 
some societies alcohol and tobacco are rarely consumed. Second, the method cannot be 
used to allocate consumption among adults of different ages, and it is often contaminated 
by the presence of older children, who may also consume the “adult” goods. This leads to 
an underestimate of the cost of these children. While the Rothbarth method cannot be 
used to estimate expenditures for the elderly, the Engel method can be used to estimate 
age-profiles of consumption for all ages, but the flaws in the method make it relatively 
unattractive. 
  Estimates are often reported in the form of equivalence scales which express the 
consumption going to different ages relative to that of a prime age adult. These scales are 
often called Equivalent Adult Consumer scales, or EAC. These have been estimated for 
many countries, both developing and developed, using the Engel and Rothbarth methods.  
It would be useful to address several questions. First, are the available methods robust? 
Do they yield plausible estimates of child costs when applied in varying contexts? 
Second, do the available methods suggest similar or substantially different equivalence 
scales when applied to the same data? If similar, the biases identified in the literature may 
be tolerable in practical applications.  Third, does the comparison of estimates using the 
same method across countries or time yield useful information about changes or 
differences in child costs?  
  Despite the extensive literature on equivalence scales, it is not yet clear to what 
extent these questions can be answered. Table 1 reports estimates of equivalence scales 
for Indonesia based on the 1996 socio-economic survey (SUSENAS; Maliki, 2005). 
Results from three methods are reported – the Engel method and, the Rothbarth method, 
and Ray’s demographic method, a variant of the Engel’s method which uses budget 
shares for several expenditure items rather than just food. The Rothbarth method was 
estimated using tobacco and adult clothing to represent adult goods.
4 The results are not 
                                                 
4 Although alcohol is not illegal in Indonesia, the population is predominantly Islamic. Thus, alcohol is not 
an appropriate variable. 
  7reassuring. The one consistent finding is that children consume less than adults. The 
Engel method and Ray method both yield high estimates for children. The Rothbarth 
method yields very low estimates, with children under five having a negative cost. The 
age pattern also varies across methods. Costs decline with age according to the Engel 
method, increase with age according to the Rothbarth estimates, and are non-monotonic 
according to the Ray method.  
If the Engel method is upward biased and the Rothbarth method is downward 
biased, then the true value would lie somewhere in between. However, it cannot be 
conclusively demonstrated that the true value in fact lies between the two estimates. 
These difficulties have led us to adopt a simple and transparent approach to 
allocating consumption to household members.  First, we allocate education and health 
expenditures to members using a method similar to one employed by Attanasio et al. 
(1999).  We regress total household education expenditures on the number of household 
members in each age group enrolled in school and the number of household members not 
enrolled, with the intercept suppressed. Private health expenditures are allocated using a 
similar regression approach, using numbers of household members in each age group as 
regressors. For some age groups, private health spending might be very low and 
estimated coefficients may sometimes be negative. To avoid this happening, health 
spending can be constrained to be non-negative. 
Second, other household consumption is allocated to individuals using an ad hoc 
allocation rule.  The allocation rule is based on an extensive review of the literature and 
follows the advice of Deaton (1997) that an ad hoc approach to child costs is probably the 
preferred approach, given problems of the Engel and Rothbarth methods. He suggests 
that children age 0-4 be 0.4 of an adult and the children age 5-14 be 0.5 and children 15 
and older be 1. We employ a more continuous, but similar equivalence scale, which is 
equal to 1 for adults aged 20 or older, declines linearly from unity at age 20 to 0.4 at age 
4 and below.  
  Using these methods, we estimate consumption for each individual in each 
household in the sample. We average across all the individuals in the survey of a given 
age to construct age schedules of private expenditures on education, on health, and on 
other items. Often, expenditures are underreported in surveys, so some further adjustment 
of the age profiles may be desirable to make them consistent with reliable national level 
control totals for total private expenditures on health, on education, and on the balance of 
total private consumption. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) and other 
reliable public statistical sources provide suitable control data. In this way, the profiles 
can be made consistent with NIPA, in general, and private and government final 
consumption expenditure, in particular. 
Public Consumption 
Public transfer programs are classified according to the following list of 11 expenditure 
categories—Public goods and services; Congestible goods and services; Health; 
Education; Sickness and disability; Old age; Survivors; Family and children; 
Unemployment; Housing; and Other. This classification scheme is based on the United 
Nation’s COFOG (Classification of Functions of Government) System. COFOG was 
developed by the UN in order to harmonize the accounting of government expenditures 
among the member nations.  
  8Our approach is to assign the benefits to the individual for whom the government 
intends them. For example, an educational voucher might be provided by the government 
to the parents of school-age children. In this case, the benefits are assigned to the children 
who are receiving the education, not to the parents who received the voucher. In some 
cases the government may provide a single cash payment to an adult in the household on 
behalf of all members of the household. In this case, each household member is assigned 
their share of this benefit.  
For estimation, we would like to know the cost of the service provided to the 
individual by the government. Survey data are unlikely to include such costs, but they can 
be calculated from administrative data. For example, Medicare (US) administrative data 
such as the Current Beneficiary Survey contain information on the medical costs of 
individuals. These data can be used to derive age profiles of costs of Medicare benefits. 
  If we lack information on the actual costs incurred for services to individuals, then 
we obtain information on program usage. For example, hospital admissions data by age 
are used to develop an age profile of medical costs. If we lack information on program 
use, then the minimum data we need is program participation, for example, school 
enrollment rates by age. We can improve our estimate by using public school enrollment 
rates rather than general enrollment rates which include public and private schooling. We 
can further improve estimates by disaggregating by grade level of schooling since costs 
may differ substantially by grade level. 
  Many public goods and services are not targeted at particular age groups.  We 
allocate these equally to all members of the population.  
Methods for Constructing Earnings Profiles 
Estimating labor income is straight-forward using individual survey data. It is the sum of 
earnings, fringe benefits, other labor income, and a share of entrepreneurial (self-
employment) income. Entrepreneurial income is typically not reported in a manner that 
allows for decomposition into returns to labor versus returns to assets. Thus, we assign a 
pre-defined age invariant portion of individual entrepreneurial income as a return to 
labor. The labor income of an individual is then the sum of these individual components 
of compensation.  
  In the case of Taiwan, self-employment income is provided on an individual basis 
and individual labor income is estimated directly as described above. However, in the 
US, entrepreneurial income is provided at the household level. In this case, we allocate it 
to individual members using a regression model, similar to that used in allocating 
household health and education expenditures. Household self-employment 
(entrepreneurial) income is regressed, with the intercept suppressed, on the total number 
of household members who are self-employed and the proportion of self-employed 
members in each age group.  Analysis of the data for several other countries with 
individual entrepreneurial income indicates that the regression method is reliable.  
Our earning age profiles are expressed per member of the population so they also 
reflect labor force participation rates, and reflect the average earnings of men and 
women.  
  9Public and Private Consumption 
The consumption side of the economic lifecycle depends on both public and private 
consumption, but their relative importance is not easily judged.  Private consumption is 
larger than public consumption.  Many public programs, however, target particular age 
groups – education for the young, health care for the elderly. Important public programs, 
e.g., pension programs, family allowances, or unemployment benefits, provide cash 
rather than in-kind transfers.  These programs lead to increases in private rather than in 
public consumption affecting the economic lifecycle indirectly.  An additional 
complexity is that public consumption may crowd out private consumption with little 
effect on the composition or age pattern of total consumption.  Thus, the public-private 
breakdown of consumption provides useful and suggestive information, but it is by no 
means definitive about how public policy influences the age pattern of total consumption.   
Public Consumption 
The importance of public consumption varies quite substantially across countries (Table 
2).  In general, public consumption as a share of total consumption rises with per capita 
income, but demographic and institutional factors play very important roles.  Public 
spending on health and education rise more sharply with income than does combined 
public spending, suggesting that age targeting is more important in high income 
countries.   The relationship between the level of economic development and public 
consumption holds to some extent for the five countries compared below.  Public 
consumption as a share of total consumption was smallest in Indonesia and Thailand and 
largest in France and the United States.  Pubic spending on health is highest in France 
and the US, countries with both higher income and older populations.  Public spending on 
education is high in France and the US, but also in Thailand which has lower income but 
a relatively large school-age population.   The substantial variation among the five 
countries compared in Table 2 stands out, suggesting the importance of country-specific 
institutional factors. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Results for Consumption  
There is a striking contrast between the cross-sectional age profiles of total consumption 
for Taiwan and the US, as shown in Figure1a and 1b. In the US, consumption rises by 
150% from birth to the early 20s; in Taiwan the corresponding increase is only 67%. In 
the US, consumption rises by a further 67% from the early 20s to age 90, whereas in 
Taiwan, there is virtually no increase at all over this age range. In total, consumption 
more than quadruples from birth to age 90 in the US, while in Taiwan it grows by only 
two thirds.  
 
<Figure 1. Per Capita Consumption, Private and Public by Sector, United States, 2000 
and Taiwan, 1998. ABOUT HERE> 
 
To be sure, these cross sections are a poor guide to the longitudinal changes for actual 
generations, which in Taiwan have been exceptionally rapid as we will see later, whereas 
  10in the US they have been relatively slow. Nonetheless, these age profiles do tell us about 
the age gradient in consumption in any given year, and this gradient is flat in Taiwan for 
adult ages, and steeply sloped across all ages in the US. We believe that the family 
support system for the elderly in Taiwan, versus public sector transfers for the elderly in 
the US, lies behind this difference.  
Age targeting of public consumption is less important in Taiwan than in the US.  
Public education targets school age children with a noticeable affect on their total 
consumption, but public education is less important in Taiwan.  Note, however, that 
private education consumption is very high and that total spending on education is higher 
in Taiwan than in the US.  Taiwan relies on national health insurance to fund health care 
spending and as a consequence (since all insurance is counted as private consumption, 
even if offered by the government) virtually all spending on health care is a component of 
private consumption.  Taiwan’s National Health Insurance program was introduced in 
1995 and by 1998 was 4.7% of total consumption as compared 6.4% for US Medicare 
and Medicaid.  The elderly consume only modestly more health care services financed 
through NHI than do the young in Taiwan, whereas the US program is limited to those 65 
and older.  Private consumption of health care by the elderly in Taiwan, including NHI-
funded care, is not much more important than private consumption of health care by US 
elderly.  This may be one reason why consumption by the elderly in Taiwan is somewhat 
lower than consumption by prime age adults and why total consumption does not rise 
with age for the elderly.  Similarly, that private consumption declines with age in the US 
cross-section may merely reflect substitution of public for private health care spending in 
the US as compared with Taiwan.   
Figure 2 charts the age profile of public consumption by age relative to average 
public consumption for all those aged 0 to 85 for the US, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, 
and France. In the absence of any age targeting, the profile would equal 1 at all ages. The 
extent of age targeting is most easily judged by comparing values for those in the 30-59 
age groups.  Judged in this way, the US and France target public consumption the most, 
while Indonesia targets public consumption the least.  The extent of targeting in Thailand 
is similar to that in France, however, and the extent of Taiwan’s targeting is similar to 
Indonesia’s.  Again, there is danger in looking at components of consumption as 
compared with total consumption, because public policy in Taiwan influences health 
consumption via public insurance rather than through the direct provision of health care.   
 
<Figure 2. Per Capita Public Consumption Age Profile  ABOUT HERE> 
 
  The age profile shows us the relative age orientation of public consumption in 
each country. The US and French programs target the young and the old.  In the case of 
France, the allocation is roughly balanced with the young and the old receiving similar 
levels of public consumption.  In the US, the program is biased more toward the elderly, 
particularly those 75 and older.  In Taiwan, Indonesia, and Thailand the programs are 
dominated by consumption by the young to the extent that they are age targeted at all. In 
Indonesia age targeting is quite limited as compared to Taiwan or Thailand. 
  11Private Consumption  
Most consumption is private rather than public, and in many important areas, food, 
housing, and clothing, for example, the private sector dominates.  The public sector is 
also important, particularly in education and health.  In some instances, the overall shape 
of the consumption profile differs significantly from the private sector, as we saw for the 
United States elderly. By and large, however, it is private consumption that dominates the 
consumption side of the lifecycle equation.   
  Estimates of consumption profiles are presented for four countries in Figure 3.  
These estimates are based on the standard NTA methodology and, hence, the differences 
across countries are not due to the use of different methods nor to different allocation 
rules within households. To make the estimated profiles more easily comparable, we have 
divided each age schedule by the unweighted average of per capita consumption at each 
age over the range 0 to 85. Thus, a value of 0.5 at some age implies that a person at that 
age consumes half the average annual amount over the first 86 years of life (assuming 
perfect survival).   
 
<Figure 3.  Age Profiles of Private Consumption, Four Economies. ABOUT HERE> 
 
  There are two distinctive patterns apparent in Figure 3.  The Asian profiles are 
more or less similar. Consumption rises rapidly with age from a value of about 0.4 among 
new-borns to a value of 1 for those in their mid- to late-teens.  For prime-age adults 
consumption ranges from the lifetime mean to 25 percent higher than the mean among 
younger adults.  Private consumption among adults declines gradually with age to a 
somewhat greater extent in Thailand and Indonesia than in Taiwan.  For those aged 65 
and older, consumption varies from a high of about 10 percent above the lifetime mean to 
a low of about 5 percent below the lifetime mean.   
  Two other features of the Asian profiles are notable.  One is the sharp increases 
among children especially in Taiwan that reflect private spending on education.  The 
second is a pronounced generation-length cycle in the Taiwan consumption data.  This is 
a Chayanov cycle that reflects the variation in per capita household income in multi-
generation families, as their age composition changes.  The peaks of the consumption 
profile correspond to ages at which two generations – those in their late twenties and late 
fifties – are employed.   
  The US pattern is quite different from the Asian.  Relative consumption by 
children is consistently lower than in the three Asian cases.  Consumption by newborns at 
0.29 is particularly low which bears further investigation in light of the importance of 
consumption at this age to subsequent child development.  While young adults have 
relatively high consumption in the Asian cases, this is not true in the US.  Those in their 
early twenties are consuming about 20 percent below the lifetime US mean.  Private 
consumption continues to increase with age in the US reaching a peak at about 35 percent 
above the lifetime mean in the mid-50s.  Thereafter consumption declines with age and at 
a faster clip than in the Asian cases.  By age 85 US private consumption is about 10 
percent above the lifetime mean, which is a bit higher than in Thailand and Indonesia, but 
similar to Taiwan.   
  What accounts for the differences in these age patterns?  First, consider 
consumption by children, which is tied to consumption by their parents.  Consumption by 
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consumption.  The connection between consumption by adults of childrearing age and 
children is far from one-to-one, however.  First, the rate of childbearing obviously 
matters.  If parents have more children, then per capita consumption by both parents and 
children will be depressed.  Second, the relationship between fertility and income 
matters.  If low income (low consumption) adults have high fertility then consumption by 
children will be depressed.  Third, the variance of childbearing matters.  If the variance is 
high, a larger percentage of children will live in large families with lower per capita 
consumption than if the variance is low.   
  Next consider adult consumption. One possible explanation is that the age profiles 
of consumption are influenced by the age profiles of current labor income.  Consumption 
by young adults (and their children) may be lower in the US relative to older adults 
because young adults earn less relative to older adults in the US as compared to Asia.  
We will see later that labor income peaks at a younger age in these three Asian countries 
than in the US, but this explains a relatively small part of the difference in the 
consumption pattern.  A final and important explanation is that private intergenerational 
transfers are much more important in the Asian countries than in the US.  A much higher 
percentage of Asians live in multi-generation households, pool their budgets, and share 
standards of living.  
 
Private Education 
A potentially important explanation for the high level of private consumption of children 
and young adults in the Asian cases is a strong commitment to education.  Emphasis on 
education is often mentioned as a key ingredient in East Asian economic success.  Private 
spending on education is very high in Japan and Taiwan, as shown in Figure 4, and in 
South Korea (not shown).  High spending on private education is not confined to East 
Asia – private spending in Brazil rivals that in Taiwan.  
  
<Figure 4. Private Education Consumption by Age. ABOUT HERE> 
 
  Private spending by age reported in Figure 4 was estimated directly for each 
country using the standard NTA methodology described above.  A relatively broad 
measure of education is used that includes pre-school costs and tutoring where it is 
available.  The values are normalized by dividing by the average consumption of an adult 
30 or older.  The rather astonishing level of spending on private education in Japan stands 
out.  Among children aged 16-18 private spending averages nearly half of the average 
adult private consumption of all goods and services.  A substantial part of this 
expenditure is devoted to Juku  – private tutoring that prepares students for college 
entrance examinations.  High levels of spending are not limited to these age groups in 
Japan, however.  Total education spending for ages 0 to 23 for the cross-section or 
synthetic cohort adds up to 4.1 years of mean adult consumption.   
  Private spending on education in Taiwan and Brazil does not match the levels in 
Japan, but it is very high in any event.  In Brazil and Taiwan lifetime spending for the 
synthetic cohort on education is 3.3 and 3.4 years of mean adult consumption, 
respectively.  Lifetime spending is much less in the other countries for which estimates 
are available.  In Thailand 0.8 years of adult consumption is devoted to education; in the 
  13US and France the figure is 0.7 years.  The case of Indonesia is intermediate with 1.5 
years of adult consumption devoted to education.   
 
Summarizing  
In many respects the US and Taiwan represent polar cases with respect to the cross-
sectional consumption profiles.  Ignoring some important details discussed above, the 
Asian countries for which estimates are presented have similar private consumption 
profiles, lower levels of spending on public spending, and public sectors that emphasize 
education more and health less.  The evidence is far too fragmented, however, to suggest 
that there is a general Asian pattern. 
  The differences and similarities between the age profiles of consumption for the 
US and Taiwan are summarized in Table 3.  The values are constructed for a synthetic 
cohort subject to the period survival rates from the 1985-89 US life table and the per 
capita age profiles for the US and Taiwan.  The mean age of consumption is younger in 
Taiwan than in the United States by 4.7 years. What accounts for this large difference?  
One can formally answer the question using the data in Table 3 and decomposition 
techniques, because the mean age is equal to weighted sum of the mean ages of the 
components where the weights are the consumption shares.  Here we take a more 
informal approach.   
 
<Table 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
  First, consider private versus public.  In both sectors, the mean age of 
consumption is lower in Taiwan than in the US.  The difference is 3.6 years for private 
consumption and a much larger 7.9 years for public consumption.  However, because 
private consumption is three to four times the magnitude of public consumption, the 
private and public sectors have effects of similar magnitude.   
  Second, education can have a potentially large effect on the mean age of 
consumption.  Because the mean age of education consumption is so different than the 
average age of total consumption, increases in the share of education lead to a relatively 
large effect on the overall mean.  In both the US and Taiwan, the mean age of education 
consumption is more than 25 years less than the mean age of consumption.  The high 
level of private education spending in Taiwan reduces both the mean age of private 
consumption and the mean of total consumption.  The effect on the mean age of total 
consumption is partially offset by the higher level of public consumption of education in 
the United States.   
  Third and clearly of great importance is the effect of high public spending on 
health in the United States.  Private spending on health is of roughly equal importance in 
Taiwan and the US and the mean ages are similar.  But public spending on health in the 
US is 7.0 percent of the total.  Moreover, the mean age of consumption of publicly 
provided health exceeds the mean age of total consumption by more than twenty years, 
reflecting the importance of Medicare and institutional Medicaid (for nursing home care).   
  Finally, not to be overlooked is other private consumption.  The difference in the 
mean ages is 3.3 years. This is an important difference given that private other 
consumption accounts for roughly two-thirds of total consumption in both Taiwan and 
the US.  By itself this accounts for more than two years of the difference in the means 
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between the US and Asian countries described above.  Differences in education spending 
and health spending do not, by themselves, explain why private consumption favors the 
young in Taiwan and the old in the United States.   
Cross-sectional estimates of labor earnings 
The shape of the age profiles of labor income for the eight economies considered here are 
similar, at a broad level, and familiar.  An inverse U-shape predominates (Figure 5).  
Although in some traditional societies, labor income remains high at older ages, this is 
not the case for any of the countries included here.  Even in Indonesia where income is 
relatively low and agricultural and informal employment dominates, the contribution to 
lifetime earnings of work after age 65 is small.  This is not a direct consequence of 
mortality, because the cross-sectional per capita calculations discussed in this section, 
and the previous section, are conditioned on survival – that is the cross-section is treated 
as a synthetic cohort assumed to survive until age 85.  In all cases the great bulk of 
lifetime earnings is concentrated in the ages 25 to 64. 
 
<Figure 5. Per Capita Labor Income Profile, Selected Countries. ABOUT HERE> 
 
There are important systematic differences in the age earnings profile across 
countries, however.  The two most distinctive features in Figure 5 are the age at which 
earnings peak and the importance of earnings in old age.  The peak age varies from age 
37 in Indonesia to age 49 in the United States – a difference of 12 years.  The share of 
lifetime earnings by those 65 and older varies from a high of 7.5 percent in Brazil and 
Taiwan to a low of 0.9 percent in France. The age at which earnings peak is strongly 
related to the level of development.  In the three most advanced economies, the US, 
Japan, and France, earnings peak at age 48 or 49.  Earnings in Brazil, Indonesia, and 
Urban China peak at a relatively young age, while Taiwan and Thailand are intermediate.   
The elderly share of earnings does not vary strongly with development.  The 
earnings of the elderly are relatively important in the US and Japan, but almost trivial in 
France due to early retirement.  The earnings of the elderly in Brazil and Taiwan are 
important, while they are small in Indonesia, Thailand, and Urban China.   
A third potentially important feature of the age earnings profile is the child’s 
share of lifetime earnings – defined here as the share earned by those under the age of 25.  
The variation across countries is relatively small.  With the exception of Indonesia, the 
other child shares fall between 6.1 and 9.0 percent (Table 4).  In Indonesia, the child 
share is 15.3 percent.   
 
What are the sources of the differences in these age patterns? A detailed 
explanation of why earnings peak later in high income than in low income countries is 
not pursued here, but a range of explanations are possible and the patterns are intriguing.  
Earnings rise fastest with age in the lower income countries, even though ample research 
shows that wages rise faster in industrial countries for those with more education.  In 
Japan, the seniority wage system ties wages much more closely to experience than in the 
United States, but the age earnings profiles of the two countries are barely 
distinguishable.  To some extent the share of earnings of the elderly is broadly consistent 
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Wise, 2001; Gruber and Wise, 1999).  As expected, the earnings shares of the elderly in 
Taiwan, the US, and Japan are quite high and in France quite low.  But the low earnings 
share of the elderly in Urban China, where public pension systems are under-developed, 
and the high share in Brazil, where public pensions systems are very substantial, are 
surprising. 
Clearly the broad measure of labor production emphasized here provides a 
different perspective as compared with more narrowly prescribed analyses that 
emphasize, for example, the wage profile for men.  Institutional factors such as the 
seniority wage system and economic structure may prove to play a less important role 
than commonly believed.   
Considering the consumption and earning profiles 
together 
So far, we have been considering consumption and earnings separately. It is also 
interesting to consider them together, for it is together that they determine the periods of 
economic dependency and the roles of intergenerational transfers. Table 5 summarizes 
and compares consumption and labor income profiles for five countries.  The upper 
panel reports the two crossing points, the youngest age and oldest age at which labor 
earning exceeds total consumption, and the span of years between these. There are 
striking differences between the US, Taiwan and Thailand, where young adults don’t 
break even until age 25 or 26, and Indonesia, where they break even at age 20.  
 
<Table 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Differences at the other crossing age are smaller, but elders become net consumer 
earliest in Taiwan and the US after ages 56 and 57; and in Thailand and Indonesia after 
ages 59 and 60. The corresponding spans of net producing ages range from low values 
of only 31 years in Taiwan and the US, versus 40 years in Indonesia, with Thailand at 33 
in between. These features of the economic life cycle can differ because of varying 
amounts of capital income versus labor income; differing levels of saving; differing 
enrollment in higher education, short-run economic fluctuations, differences in public 
policy and social systems; but also due to higher or lower support ratios which will raise 
or lower the whole consumption profile relative to the labor earnings profile across 
countries. We have not yet tried to parse out the specific factors responsible for the 
differences shown in the Table.  
It is also interesting to compare the average ages of consumption and production 
for a synthetic cohort in these countries.  Again, the mean ages are based on the per 
capita labor income and consumption profiles of each country, weighted by the US 
survival rates.  The differences between these average ages indicate the direction and 
distance of reallocations of income across age within a synthetic life cycle, assuming a 
zero discount rate.  
  We find that these reallocations are slightly upwards in the US (average age of 
consumption is 45.3 and the average age of earning is 44.4), while for Thailand they are 
slightly downwards (with a mean age of consumption at 41.5 and earning at 42.4). The 
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Taiwan and in the upward direction in Indonesia. 
  It is striking that the US and Indonesia are grouped together as having net upward 
transfers given the many differences between these two countries.  The mean age is very 
late in the US as compared with every other country, apparently due to the important role 
of Medicare expenditures on the elderly. This factor is counter-balanced to some extent 
by the late average age of earning.  Indonesia, on the other hand, has a low mean age of 
consumption and a very low mean age of earning.  To some extent both the earnings and 
consumption profiles reflect the schooling decisions being made there.   
Changes in Consumption and Labor Income over Time 
Time series of private consumption and labor income age profiles have been estimated to 
this point only for Taiwan, from 1977 to 2002, and for the United States, from 1980 to 
2000.  A comparison of these two economies is quite interesting, however, for a variety 
of reasons, but particularly because of the great difference in their rates of economic 
growth.  Here we will examine the rates of growth by age. We leave the examination of 
the cohort trends for another occasion. 
  Figure 6 plots the average annual growth in real private consumption and labor 
income at each age. To remove the effects of short-term fluctuations, the estimates are 
based on five-year centered moving averages of the age profiles.  Labor income for 
persons aged x in year t is the average of labor income of persons aged x for years t-2 to 
t+2.  The time series are thereby reduced to 1979-1999 for Taiwan and for 1982-1997 for 
the US. The growth rates are presented only for ages 15 and older as those who were 
younger had no significant labor income in either economy. 
  
<Figure 6.  Annual Growth of Private Consumption and Labor Income by Age, Real, 
Taiwan 1979-1999 and the US 1982-1997. ABOUT HERE> 
 
  As should come as no surprise, the growth rates for both private consumption and 
labor income in Taiwan are substantially higher than in the US.  For Taiwan, the age-
profiles of consumption and labor income increased at annual real rates of 5.5% and 4.6% 
per year, respectively.   The age profiles of consumption and labor income in the US 
shifted upwards at real annual rates of 1.9% and 1.3%.
5  Growth in Taiwan was 
spectacular; in the US it was moderate. 
  The stability of the age-profile of private consumption in Taiwan is remarkable.  
Consumption of those in their thirties and those in their mid-seventies and older grew 
somewhat faster than average.  Consumption by those in their late fifties and early sixties 
grew somewhat slower than average.  Overall, however, there is virtually no generational 
shift in consumption in Taiwan during this period.  The lack of change is all the more 
surprising given the many other dramatic changes in Taiwan during this period, e.g., 
rapid economic growth and large changes in age structure. We believe that this sustained 
equality across adult ages reflects resource sharing within co-residential households, in 
contrast to the nuclear families of the U.S. 
                                                 
5 Values are calculated using survival weights to calculate average private consumption and labor income 
and explained in more detail above.  
  17  The consumption profile growth rates for the US are clearly more rapid above age 
50 than below, with a difference of nearly one percent per year.
6 This difference is 
substantial in comparison with the average US growth rate during this period. 
  The labor income growth rates vary more with age than the consumption growth 
rates in both economies, more so in Taiwan than in the US.  Certain features are common 
to both economies.  The slowest growth was at the youngest ages – among teenagers in 
Taiwan and twenty-year-olds in the United States.  The most rapid growth was at older 
ages – those in their mid-seventies and older in Taiwan and those in their sixties and 
older in the US.  Note that at the highest ages, labor income in both economies is 
relatively low and a large percentage increase does not translate into a large absolute 
increase.   In Taiwan, the labor income of adults near conventional retirement age grew 
much more slowly than the labor income of younger adults.   
  Is there any connection between private consumption and labor income?  The 
simple correlation between the age profiles of the growth rates of private consumption 
and labor income are 0.80 in the US and 0.50 in Taiwan.  The size of the ‘effects’ are 
modest, however.  An increase in the rate of growth of labor income by one percentage 
point is associated with a 0.26 percentage point increase in the rate of growth of private 
consumption in the US and a 0.09 percentage point increase in Taiwan.  This is a rather 
modest amount of tracking, but reflects in part the inclusion of age groups (the young and 
the old) for which labor income is relatively unimportant.  If we consider only those aged 
21 to 60, the partial effect rises to 0.59 in the US and 0.49 in Taiwan; the simple 
correlation increases to 0.70 in Taiwan and 0.87 in the US.  The effects are substantial, 
but still well below a value of one.  This suggests that current earnings are to some extent 
driving private consumption, but there are also variations in consumption growth that 
exhibit a considerable degree of independence from variations in labor income. 
Conclusions 
Understanding the economic lifecycle – how it varies and why – is important in its own 
right, but is also critical to understanding how changes in population age structure 
influence many features of the macroeconomy.  There are few previous efforts, 
however, to estimate how consumption and production of individuals vary over the 
entire lifespan.  A number of technical difficulties, some of which are described above, 
create substantial hurdles to such an enterprise.   
We have presented estimates of labor earnings and consumption for a wide range 
of contemporary economies, including mature economies, rapidly growing economies, 
and low-income countries, from the West and from the East.  The estimated cross-
sectional age profiles of labor income are broadly similar and the hump shape is 
consistent with our expectations. However, there are striking contrasts in the timing of 
earnings over the life cycle, with the peak age ranging from 37 in Indonesia to 49 in the 
U.S.  
The consumption profiles reveal even more striking contrasts, starting with the 
flat age profile of total consumption in Taiwan and the steeply rising one for the U.S., 
which we believe reflects the extended family versus the state as the primary locus of 
transfers to the elderly. Profiles for private consumption are also quite variable, with 
                                                 
6 Calculated by regressing the growth rate of private consumption on age. 
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peaking late at around 55. Private expenditures on education show wide variations, with 
unusually high expenditures in some Asian countries. Because of possible public-private 
substitutions, it is questionable to assign causality to either for differences in total 
consumption, but it is hard to avoid noticing that without public spending on Medicare 
and institutional Medicaid in the U.S., total consumption would decline after 55, 
whereas with them, it rises strongly.  
Considering the consumption and earnings profiles together, we are surprised by 
the short period of life during which individuals are producing more than they are 
consuming – barely more than 30 years in the US, Taiwan, and Thailand. The brevity of 
this phase contrasts sharply with high life expectancy, approaching 80 years in many 
countries. 
We have also looked at two decades of change in the U.S. and in Taiwan. The 
stability of the Taiwan consumption profile is remarkable in light of its extraordinary 
economic growth, and we attribute this stability to the extended family. In the US we 
find that consumption at older ages has been rising over time considerably faster than in 
childhood, increasing the steepness of the lifecycle consumption gradient.  
Many important questions remain to be explored, and we look forward both to 
broadening the analysis to include the experience of more countries and to deepening it 
by probing the causes of the differences we observe.  
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Table 1. Alternative estimates of equivalence scales, Indonesia, 1996.  
Method 0-4  5-9  10-14 Notes 
Engel’s   0.87   0.72   0.62    
Rothbarth   <0   0.06   0.32   Cigarettes  
Rothbarth   <0   0.22   0.64   Adult clothing  
Ray 0.88  0.91  0.83   
Source: Maliki (2005) and calculation by authors. 
 
Table 2. Government Share of Final Consumption Expenditure, 2000, Selected Countries 
and Countries of the World by Per Capita Income. 
Government Share of Final Consumption Expenditure (%) 
Name (Per Capita GDP)  Total Health Education 
Indonesia ($2,807)  9.6  0.8  2.0 
Thailand ($5,846)  16.5  3.1  7.9 
Taiwan ($14,114)  19.3  0.3  3.9 
France ($23,225)  29.8  9.1  7.4 
US ($31,338)  23.8  6.4  5.8 
 
Per Capita GDP 
Less than $1,000  15.6  2.2  3.0 
$1,000-4,999 16.1  2.9  4.5 
$5,000-9,999 20.7  4.6  5.9 
$10,000 or more  25.4  7.1  7.0 
Notes and Sources:  Per capita GDP is purchasing power parity adjusted using 1995 prices.  
Source is World Bank World Development Indicators 2004, except for Taiwan for which 
source is DGBAS Statistical Yearbook of Taiwan 2004 and Mason et al. (2004).  For the US 
Medicare and Medicaid expenditures are included in public health spending. 
 
Table 3.  A Summary of per Capita Consumption Profiles, US 2000 and Taiwan 1998.  
          
   United States  Taiwan 
     Share of Total  Mean age  Share of Total  Mean age 
Consumption 100.0  45.1  100.0  40.4 
  Private Consumption  76.4  45.7  75.6  42.1 
      Education  1.4  16.8  3.7  15.1 
      Health  8.0  50.5  8.6  51.3 
      Other   67.0  45.7  63.2  42.4 
  Public Consumption  23.6  43.3  24.4  35.4 
      Education  5.2  13.9  4.1  15.0 
      Health  7.0  67.2  0.4  39.5 
      Other   11.4  39.5  19.9  39.5 
Note.  Estimates are based on survival-weighted age profiles using the US period life table for 
1985-89.   
 
 
  23Table 4. A Summary of Per Capita Earnings Profiles, 9 Countries. 
  Mean age  Peak age  Share under 25  Share 65+ 
Indonesia (1996) 

















































Note.  Estimates are based on survival-weighted age profiles using the US period life table for 
1985-89.   
 
 




(1996)  Taiwan (1998)Thailand (1998) US (2000) 
Crossing ages for consumption and labor income (Yl(x)>C(x)) 
First age  20  25  26  26 
Last age  60  56  59  57 
Span 40  31  33  31 
Mean ages based on profiles weighted by US 1985-89 survival rates 
Consumption 40.6  40.4  41.5  45.3 
Labor income  37.9  42.7  42.4  44.4 
Differences 2.7 -2.3  -0.9  0.9 
 













































































































































































































































































































































































Values in parentheses are the sums of the age specific education values for each country.  Amount spent on education per surviving 


























































































































































)Figure 6. Annual Growth of Private Consumption and Labor Income by Age, Real, 
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